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Assessing Bettors’ Ability to Process Dynamic
Information: Policy Implications
Johnnie E. V. Johnson,* Raymond O’Brien,{ and Ming-Chien Sung{
Regulation is often employed to encourage the provision of readily interpretable, explicit
information to betting markets in an effort to promote their efficiency. This approach is
supported by a considerable volume of laboratory-based research which suggests that individuals
make poor judgments in the face of implicit, dynamic information. This article investigates to
what extent horserace bettors, who have strong incentives to make good probability judgments,
require the regulator’s protection from such hostile information environments. In particular, we
examine the accuracy of the subjective probabilities of bettors concerning 16,344 horses in 1671
races. We find that bettors are skilled in adopting effective heuristics to simplify their dynamic
information environment and, even in the face of restricted information, develop well-calibrated
judgments using outcome feedback. A number of factors that help bettors to achieve good
calibration are identified and the implications for market regulation are discussed.
JEL Classification: G13, G14, G17
1. Introduction
Success in many areas of human endeavor stems from the ability to convert rapidly
changing information into accurate probability judgments. Dynamic information environments
are often subject to sporadic adjustments resulting from structural instabilities (e.g., in the
business world, from announcements concerning impending acquisitions or innovations). There
is a wealth of laboratory-based evidence that individuals base their forecasts on human
judgment rather than statistical methods when faced by such dynamic information (e.g.,
Dalrymple 1987; Taranto 1989). These forecasts are often based on heuristics, which result in
systematically biased judgments (Kahneman et al. 1982; Timmermans 1993; Baranski and
Petrusic 1995). These problems are exacerbated if the information remains implicit (e.g.,
rumor). Consequently, in an effort to counteract the adverse impact these effects might have on
market efficiency, regulators attempt to ensure that market participants receive information in
a timely, explicit, and consistent fashion. While the need for information to promote market
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efficiency is not under dispute, there is growing evidence that individuals may not require
explicit information. For example, Remus et al. (1996, p. 23) indicate that ‘‘humans have the
ability to detect and react to structural instability that characterizes many business forecasting
tasks’’ and there is evidence that judgmental forecasters can develop well-calibrated subjective
probability judgments under appropriate conditions (e.g., Johnson and Bruce 2001).
In summary, there are conflicting views concerning decision makers’ ability to handle
structurally unstable, implicit information. However, much of the evidence that questions the
reliability of individuals’ probability judgments has been derived from the laboratory.
Consequently, this article examines to what extent and in what manner individuals’ probability
judgments in a real-world betting market account for dynamic, often implicit, information. The
aim is to provide betting market regulators with evidence to help them decide which
information is necessary to promote market efficiency and how it needs to be disseminated.
This may help avoid the pitfalls of an over-regulated, stifled market whilst allowing for an
adequate flow of appropriate information.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
addressing probability judgments in dynamic information environments and outlines the
article’s research questions. Section 3 describes the data, explains the methodological
advantages of the chosen setting, and describes the procedures used to explore the research
questions. Section 4 presents the results, which are discussed in section 5. Some concluding
remarks follow in section 6.
2. Probability Judgments in Dynamic Environments
Existing Literature
Complexity exacerbates the difficult task of processing data and increases when the
information required for judgments remains uncertain and changes through time. Under such
conditions, individuals often rely on their own judgments rather than on statistical forecasts
(e.g., Kleinmutz 1990; Sanders and Manrodt 1994). These judgments are often less accurate
than forecasts based on simple statistical models (e.g., Mocan and Azad 1995; Remus et al.
1995) because the latter forecasts act as a form of task information feedback, which can
improve judgments even more than outcome feedback (Balzer et al. 1994; Remus et al. 1996;
Sanders, 1997).
Individuals’ assessment of dynamic information can be hindered by their limited cognitive
capacity (Hogarth 1987). This capacity is challenged by increased complexity, arising, for
example, from implicit information. Under such conditions individuals increasingly rely on
heuristics (Bolger and Harvey 1993), which can result in systematic biases (Kahneman et al.
1982; Fildes 1991; Cohen 1993; Harvey et al. 1994) and a reduction in decision quality
(Malhotra 1982; Ford et al. 1989; Timmermans 1993) and probability judgment accuracy
(Baranski and Petrusic 1994, 1995; Suantek et al. 1996). Furthermore, poor calibration is
exacerbated if the information is uncertain or changing (Griffin and Tversky 1992; Chinander
and Schweitzer 2003). The assessment of dynamic information is also hindered by the tendency
to desire consistent information (Soll 1999). This leads to dissonant information being
discounted (Harries et al. 2004), which reduces the ability to react to structural shifts.
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From the previous discussion it is clear that there are a number of factors that can reduce
an individual’s ability to effectively handle dynamic information. However, research suggests
that these findings may arise from the artificial nature of some experimental calibration studies
(Gigerenzer et al. 1991; Ayton and Wright 1994). The excellent calibration observed in some
naturalistic settings appears to support this view (Murphy and Brown 1985; Keren 1991;
Johnson and Bruce 2001). There is also evidence that certain factors can support probability
judgments under dynamic, naturalistic information conditions. For example, individuals alter
behavior based on outcome information (Kopelman 1986; Jones et al. 1997) and they tend to
make judgments based on the most recent evidence in a sequence of contradictory evidence
(Ashton and Kennedy 2002). ‘‘Recency’’ may foster appropriate reaction to structural shifts in
an evolving information set. In addition, it has been proposed that evolution has equipped
individuals to process probabilistic information from frequencies observed in a natural
environment (Gigerenzer 2000; Hoffrage et al. 2002). In summary, there is mixed evidence
concerning individuals’ ability to handle dynamic information.
Can individuals make full use of dynamic information even if this is not made explicit? The
answer to this question may affect how policy makers frame their regulations concerning the
provision of information to market participants.
Regulation Policy and Research Questions
The British Horseracing Authority (BHA), the official regulatory authority governing
U.K. horse racing, administers the rules of racing. For example, they ensure that racetracks
adhere to a set of common standards, including the minimum levels of information they must
provide to the betting public (e.g., explanations required of trainers if their horses perform
unexpectedly badly, etc.). The BHA is mindful of the need to develop regulations that ensure
the sport is run effectively and efficiently and in the best interests of a range of stakeholders
(e.g., racehorse and racetrack owners, and the betting public). This is achieved by maintaining a
balance between sufficient and overly restrictive regulation (which may stifle or reduce the
attraction of the sport and the betting market on which it depends).
Racetrack operators can cause structural shifts in the information provided to bettors
(which they require to make accurate probability judgments). For example, racetrack operators
can alter the ground conditions between races (e.g., through harrowing or rolling tracks with
artificial surfaces). This could, for example, change the advantage of a particular post position
(hereafter PP: the barrier position from which a horse starts a race). Previous laboratory-based
research, discussed above, suggests that bettors are unlikely to make good probability
judgments in the face of such structural shifts, particularly if the information remains implicit
or is only allowed to leak out in the form of rumor. If regulators believe that bettors will not
effectively process implicit, dynamic information created by such management changes, they
might require racetrack operators to minimize the degree to which they engage in these
practices and/or to announce their actions in advance. Consequently, to assist the regulators in
making such judgments, two key research questions are addressed: To what extent bettors,
when faced by a dynamic and implicit information set, (i) account for the full information
content of evolving data in their probability judgments, and (ii) form good probability
judgments based on heuristics that employ a linear model of current information or a historical
model that accounts for the full complexity of information from previous trading periods.
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3. Methodology
This section explains why the horserace betting market is an ideal setting for studying the
manner in which dynamic information is used in forming probability judgments and introduces
the dataset and procedures that will be used to address the research questions.
Characteristics of the U.K. Horserace Betting Markets
In discussing the characteristics of the U.K. horserace bookmaker betting market, the
following topics will be addressed: (i) the manner in which subjective probability judgments are
revealed in betting markets, (ii) the similarities between decisions made in betting markets and
those made in other environments, (iii) how the availability of an unequivocal outcome to a
horserace facilitates the analysis of the manner in which information is used by bettors, and (iv)
the nature of the particular dynamic information set that is used in this study.
Revelation of Probability Judgments in Betting Markets
Bettors in U.K. bookmaker horserace betting markets purchase assets (place bets), the
returns to which depend upon the result of the horserace to which the particular market relates.
‘‘In its simplest formulation, the market for bets in an n-horse race corresponds to a market for
contingent claims with n states in which the ith state corresponds to the outcome in which the
ith horse wins the race’’ (Shin 1993, p. 1142). The odds of horse i in race j (Oij) are determined
initially by bookmakers’ perceptions of the probability of each horse winning. They then adjust
the odds as new information becomes available, much of which arrives in the form of bets
placed on each horse. Bettors have an incentive to continue to place money on a given horse
until its odds are proportional to the market’s best estimate of that horse’s chance of winning
the race (Figlewski 1979). In state-contingent claim terms, the purchase price of a claim on
horse i in race j is given by the fraction of one pound denoted by 1/(1 + Oij). This claim will pay
one pound if the horse wins but nothing if it loses. Consequently, in line with Figlewski’s (1979)
argument, we assume that the market’s subjective probability is given by
psij~
1

1zOij
 
Xnj
i~1
1

1zOij
 
where nj is the number of horses in race j. In a bookmaker market the final market odds
combine the views of those who determine horses’ chances of success using some private
information (for example, owners, trainers, etc.) and those who use largely publicly available
information (i.e., the wider betting public and the bookmakers themselves).
Betting Markets: Similarities to Other Decision Environments
The appeal of betting markets as settings for empirical enquiry into various aspects of
decision making is well-established (Hong and Chiu 1988; Law and Peel 2002; Paton et al.
2009). They share many features in common with wider financial markets (Snyder 1978) and
they provide a means of examining decisions made in a natural environment that involves
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multi-events, multi-cues and informational turbulence, the conditions that exist in many
naturalistic environments (Orasanu and Connolly 1993).
The Advantages of an Unequivocal Outcome
Sauer (1998) observes that betting markets offer an opportunity to understand economic
behavior that might prove difficult in more complicated financial markets. The main reason for
this is that betting markets generate an unequivocal outcome (a winner) within a finite time
frame. Consequently, there is a point in time at which all uncertainty in the market is resolved,
providing an objective benchmark against which to measure the quality of the probability
judgments, revealed as odds. More specifically, the subjective probabilities inherent in odds and
associated with particular information features (for example, a horse’s PP) can be compared
with the objective probability of success (as revealed, ex post, by race outcomes). This provides
a basis for assessing the degree to which information (for example, PP) is discounted in odds. In
addition, there is a large pool of markets (races) of essentially similar type available for
analysis.
The Nature of the Dynamic Information Set
This article explores the extent to which bettors employ dynamic and often implicit
information relating to ‘‘PP bias’’ in their probability judgments. The nature of PP bias
information and why this might be regarded as a dynamic information set is now explained.
Horses running in flat races of less than two miles in the United Kingdom are required to
begin their races from ‘‘starting stalls,’’ which are devices that ensure that all horses are released
to start the race at the same moment in time. Each horse is randomly allocated a PP, and these
are announced the day before the race. The PP determines where in relation to the inside of the
racetrack the horse will start the race and where the horse is often forced, due to the position of
other runners, to run much of the race. Due to track configuration (e.g., short oval racetracks
with sharp bends) or other racetrack topography (e.g., faster ground on the outside of the
track), certain PPs may be advantageous. Most racing publications agree that PP needs to be
considered carefully when assessing a horse’s chances. For example, Cotton (1990, p. 113), in
an influential book on horserace betting, advises ‘‘… make no mistake, post-position can be the
most important component in the outcome of many flat races.’’ Similarly, Beyer (1983, p. 42)
observes: ‘‘while most biases are due to the idiosyncrasies in the racing surface, many tracks
have shapes that influence the results. At tracks less than a mile in circumference, the sharp
turns and short straight almost always work to the advantage of the front runners and horses
on the inside.’’
Data from a U.K. racetrack (Wolverhampton), which has a configuration similar to that
referred to by Beyer (1983), is employed in this study. Wolverhampton is a small oval circuit of
only one mile circumference with tight bends and a short run in of 380 yards. It is surfaced with
‘‘fiber-sand,’’ a mixture of sand bound together loosely by synthetic fibers. Racing commenced
there in December 1993, and the dataset for the current study contains races run between 1995
and 2000. Races run earlier than this period were not chosen because bettors had little available
evidence on which to base their views of the PP bias and expert advice concerning the bias in
racing publications was not available to bettors. Races run after 2000 were not examined
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because major changes occurred in U.K. horserace betting at this time (e.g., the introduction of
Betfair). These changes are likely to have significantly changed market ecology and the
composition of market participants in such a way as to alter the degree to which data is
discounted in odds.
During the period of analysis the racetrack managers engaged in various practices to try to
eliminate PP bias. There are a number of reasons why they may have sought to eliminate PP
bias, including that the bias may deter owners and trainers of better horses from entering races
for fear that their prospects may be unduly influenced by the random PP draw. In addition,
jockeys may engage in dangerous riding tactics in an attempt to offset the effects of a poor PP,
and bettors, particularly informed bettors, may be deterred if they believe that PP bias unduly
complicates the analysis of a horse’s prospects.
Wolverhampton’s racetrack managers used a variety of measures to eliminate the PP
bias, including altering the drainage system, resurfacing the track and changing the
harrowing (mechanical raking to prevent compaction of the surface), and watering and
‘‘luting’’ (mechanical raking to distribute sand evenly across the track) practices at different
meetings—even after particular races at the same meeting. No record was kept of the precise
timing of these track management changes, and the changes concerning harrowing and luting
practices were never announced to the public. Although experienced racegoers may have
observed some of these practices, the majority of the betting public (who, in the United
Kingdom, bet in betting offices away from the racetrack) would not be explicitly aware of
these changing practices. They could only discern changing PP bias by their analysis of past
results. Interviews with the Clerk of the Course (who has overall responsibility for
management of the racetrack) confirmed that he believed that these practices did have a
significant effect on the PP bias. The changing nature of comments in racing publications
concerning the PP bias at Wolverhampton during this period corroborates his view. These
comments range from ‘‘high numbers had a marked advantage in the early stages on the new
fiber-sand course, but the effect seems to be diminishing’’ (Raceform, 1995, p. xvi) to ‘‘high
numbers have a definite advantage’’ (Superform—Races and Racehorses, 1996, p. 1511) and
later ‘‘high numbers have the moderate advantage’’ (Superform—Races and Racehorses,
2000, p. 1716).
In summary, PP data in horserace betting markets is likely to represent a sporadically
changing (e.g., when new track management practices are introduced), evolving (jockeys may
alter their riding tactics over a period to try to compensate for the bias), and often implicit (e.g.,
when bettors are not made aware of the changes) information set.
Data and Procedures
This section describes the data and the procedures employed in this study: First, a model is
introduced that is designed to capture the extent to which PP bias influences a horse’s chance of
success. This is used to evaluate the information content of PP bias. Second, a procedure is
outlined that facilitates measurement of the extent to which the information contained in PP
bias is accounted for in bettors’ probability judgments. Third, we discuss how the model of PP
bias is used to confirm that the bias changed. Finally, procedures are introduced for testing the
extent to which bettors’ probability judgments incorporated simplified models of PP bias based
on current year or historical PP bias.
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Data
The dataset employed in this study contains details of the PP, the final declared odds from
the bookmaking market, and the finishing positions for each of 16,344 runners in 1671 races
run at Wolverhampton racetrack between January 1995 and August 2000. The races were run
over distances from 5 to 16.21 furlongs (1100 to 3566.2 yards), with a mean of 8.46 furlongs
(1860.1 yards), the majority of races (1527) being run at distances of less than 12 furlongs (2640
yards). The number of runners in each race varied from 2 (1 race) to 13 (254 races), with a mean
of 9.8, most races involving more than eight runners (1329 races).
Post-Position Bias Model
In developing a model to account for Wolverhampton’s PP bias, we consulted a number of
racing publications that provide statistics and advice to bettors concerning this topic. While
there were clear differences from year to year, most agreed that horses with a ‘‘high’’ PP (i.e.,
starting stalls position furthest from the centre of the track) had an advantage. This advantage
is counterintuitive when simply considering the configuration of the Wolverhampton track (a
small oval circuit) as horses with low PPs are most likely to run on the inside of the track,
reducing the total distance they must run. Discussions with the Clerk of the Course and with
horseracing experts from a leading racing publication (Raceform) helped to identify possible
physical reasons for the PP bias. The racetrack is cambered, two degrees on the straights and
four degrees on the bends, and, consequently, sand can migrate towards the centre of the track,
making the ground there soft compared to the relatively firm ground towards the outside of the
track, causing horses running nearer the center of the track to run more slowly. The consensus
was that loose material migrates to the inside rail during very dry weather and/or cold weather.
During very dry weather the lack of moisture in the sand means it easily migrates when kicked
up by horses. To prevent the track from freezing in cold conditions it is mechanically deep-
raked (harrowed) between races and this process can cause loose material to migrate to the
inside (this process can occur between race meetings under ‘‘normal’’ weather conditions). In
addition, during wet conditions, water drains from the outside towards the inside of the track,
carrying loose material to the center of the track. This causes the inside rail area of the track to
become more water-logged than that up the slope, again causing horses on the inside to run
slower than those running wide on the track. Consequently, whatever the weather conditions, it
is generally believed that Wolverhampton racetrack’s topology causes the inside rail (‘‘low PP’’)
to have the least favorable underfoot conditions. This disadvantage accrues, despite the shorter
distance traveled by a horse on the inside rail and the disadvantage experienced by those
running on the outside of having to run up a greater slope on each bend (there is a two-degree
difference in gradient between the slope and the bend). Betton (1994, p. 512) estimates that such
a climb is likely to cause a 20% ‘‘reduction in horse’s pulling ability,’’ without equivalent
compensation in muscular energy when running down the slope into the straight. The Clerk of
the Course also indicated that in the first few years of running at Wolverhampton harrowing
was only performed across 80% of the racetrack, from the inside rail outwards. Consequently,
it is possible that the fiber-sand surface towards the outside became more compacted, resulting
in faster underfoot conditions.
In developing a PP bias model, we define the following variables: bj 5 the number of bends
in a particular race j, r 5 the radius of a bend in yards, Dj 5 the official distance of the race in
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yards (measured around inside rail), w 5 the average effective width of a racing horse in yards,
and mij + 1 5 horse i’s PP in race j. Jockeys may maneuver their horses during a race to occupy
positions relative to the inside rail that are different from their initial post positions. However,
this can be difficult because moving to the outside rail will involve exertion of energy to move
up the camber and moving closer to the rail often requires exertion of energy to get in front of
other horses. Consequently, when developing the model it is assumed that horses remain
throughout the race in the position relative to the inside of the track determined by their PP.
Then the distance traveled around bends by horse i in race j is given by bj p (r + mij w) and the
distance traveled on straights is given by Dj 2 bj p r. We assume that the average speed of a
horse running over a distance of D on the inside rail is f(D) S1, where S1 5 the average speed of
a horse running on the inside rail over a distance of 1100 yards (the shortest distance race) and
f(D) is a function which determines the reduction in average speed of a horse running on the
inside rail over a distance of more than 1100 yards (i.e., f [1100] 5 1). To simplify the model, it
is assumed that horses can run at the same average speed around bends as on the straight. It is
also assumed that due to changes in the composition of the track surface, horses run slower/
faster the further they are from the inside rail and that there is a differential effect on straights
(cf. around bends) and at different race distances, captured by g(mij, Dj) and h(mij, Dj). These
functions determine the increase/reduction in average speed of horse i running in PP (i.e., mij +
1) on straights and bends, respectively, over a distance of more than 1100 yards compared to a
horse running on the inside rail over 1100 yards. Consequently, the average speed of a horse
drawn mij + 1 running on straights at distance Dj is g(mij, Dj) ? f(Dj) ? S1, and running round
bends is h(mij, Dj) ? f(Dj) ? S1.
To estimate the form of f(D), curve fit facilities in SPSSX were used to determine the
relationship between the published record speeds at each distance at Wolverhampton divided
by the record speed at 1100 yards (i.e., S1) and the race distance D. The relationship appeared
to be approximately linear with the following form: f(D) 5 1.0317 2 0.00004D (R2 5 0.96).
In estimating the functional forms of g(m, D) and h(m, D), the properties these might be
expected to exhibit were considered: They should be capable of giving a number greater than/
less than 1 when the average speed of a horse drawn at position m + 1 over distance D is faster/
slower than a horse drawn on the inside rail (m 5 0) in a 1100 yard race, and, in addition, they
should allow g(0, 1100) 5 h(0,1100) 5 1. Moreover, it is expected that the effect of differential
speed should be most marked near the inside rail (i.e., when m approaches zero) and for the
marginal effect to decline as m increases. Consequently, a simple form of these functions might
be g(m, D) 5 1/(1 + a
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
p
) and h(m, D) 5 1/(1 + b
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m
p
). When exploring changes in the PP
advantage from year to year, it will be useful to assess to what extent the bias varies with race
distance and, consequently, functions of the following form, which have these properties, will
then be adopted: g(m, D) 5 1/(1 + amD/x) and h(m, D) 5 1/(1 + bmD/y) where a, b, x and y are to
be estimated.
The time it takes for a horse i drawn mij + 1, to complete a race j is, therefore, proportional
to the distance traveled on straight track divided by its average speed on straight track plus the
distance traveled on bends divided by its average speed on bends. This is given, as follows:
Dj{bjpr
 
1zam
Dj=x
ij
 
1:0317{0:00004Dj
 
S1
z
bjp rzmijw
 
1zbm
Dj=y
ij
 
1:0317{0:00004Dj
 
S1
: ð1Þ
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Clearly, the winner of race j will be the horse with the minimum value of this function, and
because S1 is a constant, this is equivalent to identifying the horse with the maximum value of
the following function:
{ Djzbjpmijw
 
1:0317{0:00004Dj
 {
Dj{bjpr
 
am
Dj=x
ij
 
1:0317{0:00004Dj
 {
bjp(rzmijw) bm
Dj=y
ij
 
(1:0317{0:00004Dj)
: ð2Þ
Hereafter, the first element in this function will be referred to as the ‘‘distance factor,’’ the
second element as the ‘‘straights factor,’’ and the third element as the ‘‘bends factor.’’
The aim is to use the sample data to estimate the optimal values for a, b, x, and y. To
achieve this, a ‘‘winningness’’ index Wij of horse i in race j is defined as function (2) given above
(f2(a, b, x, y)), plus an independent error term eij as follows:
Wij~f2 a, b, x, yð Þzeij : ð3Þ
Wij is defined such that the horse that is observed to win a particular race has the largest
winningness index of all runners in that race. Consequently, the probability of horse h winning
race j (phj) is given as follows:
phj~Pr(WhjwWij , i~1, 2, :::: nj, i=h), ð4Þ
where nj 5 number of runners in race j. Consequently,
phj~Pr(f2 a, b, x, yð Þhjzehjwf2 a, b, x, yð Þijzeij, i~1, 2 :::: nj, i=h): ð5Þ
The Wij cannot be observed directly. However, whether horse i wins race j can be observed and
a win/lose variable tij is defined such that
tij~1 if Wij~Max W1j, W2j, . . . , Wnjj
 
; tij~0 otherwise:
Consequently, the probability of horse h winning race j can be represented as follows:
phj~Pr thj~1 f2 a, b, x, yð Þij , i~1, 2 :::::, nj

 
: ð6Þ
McFadden (1974) demonstrates that if the error terms eij in Equation 5 are assumed to be
independent (and this seems likely as PP for each race is allocated by a random device) and
distributed according to the double exponential distribution, this produces the conditional
logit (CL) function. Consequently, the probability of horse i winning race j is given as
follows:
pij~
exp f2 a, b, x, yð Þij
 
Xnj
i~1
exp f2 a, b, x, yð Þij
  , ð7Þ
where a and b are parameters that measure the importance of PP in determining the
likelihood of horse i winning race j (for the distance run on straight track and on bends,
respectively). The parameters a, b, x, and y are estimated by maximizing the joint probability
of observing the results of all J races in the sample. Consequently, the value of the following
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log-likelihood (LL) function is maximized:
LL~
XJ
j~1
Xnj
i~1
tij ln pij : ð8Þ
Thus, we assume the outcomes of races are independent events and following McFadden
(1974) we assume that the random components ehj of the winningness indices for different
horses are independent.
Modeling Bettors’ Subjective Probability Judgments
To measure the extent to which bettors use the information content of PP bias in their
judgments revealed in the prevailing market odds, two CL functions are estimated. The first
incorporates simply the log of the probability implied by the final market odds, psij :
pij~
exp l ln (psij)
 
Xnj
i~1
l ln (psij)
  : ð9Þ
The second incorporates both psij and a function similar to that derived above to account for PP
bias (i.e., f2(a, b, x, y)):
pij~
exp f2 a, b, x, yð ÞijzQ ln (psij)
 
Xnj
i~1
exp f2 a, b, x, yð ÞijzQ ln (psij)
  : ð10Þ
As discussed above, the parameters, a, b, x, y, Q and l are estimated by maximizing the
appropriate likelihood functions.
The maximum likelihood (LL) value of the model represented by Equation 10 is compared
with the maximum LL of the model represented by Equation 9 using a likelihood ratio (LR)
test. If the test detects a significant difference, this will imply that some of the information
concerning PP bias is not accounted for in bettors’ decisions.
Modeling the Changing Nature of Post-Position Bias through Time
In order to confirm that PP bias at Wolverhampton racetrack changes through time, three
procedures are employed:
First, for each of the six years (1995–2000), CL models represented by Equation 7 are
estimated. The degree to which PP bias explains winning probabilities is then determined using
the pseudo-R2 (Hauser 1978). Clearly, large differences in R2 from year to year would suggest
that the degree to which PP affects winning probabilities also changes substantially.
Second, the values of the parameters a, b, x, and y in the CL models developed for each of
the six years are compared. Large differences in the size, sign, and significance of these
parameters would suggest that the influence of the different elements of PP bias captured by (2)
changes over time (e.g., distances traveled around bends).
Third, the sum of the information content of each of the individual year’s models is
compared with the information content of a combined model for all six years (1995–2000); the
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information content of each year k’s model being measured by its maximum LL value, Lk, and
the combined model’s information content being measured by its maximum LL value, Lc. If the
parameters are time-invariant, the quantity 22(Lc 2
P
k Lk) is distributed x
2
n, where n is the
difference between the total number of parameters estimated in the individual year’s models
and the number of parameters estimated in the combined model. If this LL ratio test is
significant, it suggests that if the coefficients of the various parameters are allowed to change
from year to year, the separate annual models better explain the PP bias than a combined
model for 1995–2000 (Windmeijer 1995).
Finally, in order to explore the extent to which bettors account for the changing PP bias
over the period, LR tests, similar to those discussed in ‘‘Modeling Bettors’ Subjective
Probability Judgments’’ are conducted for each of the years. Significant differences in the LR
values of these models in a given year will suggest that bettors do not fully account for PP bias
in their betting decisions in that particular year.
Simplified Models of Post-Position Bias
As will be shown below, bettors do not fully discount all information concerning PP bias.
Consequently, we examine the nature of the PP bias information that bettors do take into
account when making their betting decisions. In particular, we explore two heuristics or
simplified models they may adopt: (i) an historical CL model of PP bias that incorporates
probabilities derived from a comprehensive model of PP bias effects from the previous year, t 2
1, and (ii) a simple model that accounts for linear PP effects using the current year’s data.
When forming subjective probability estimates of a horse’s chance of winning, it is
conceivable that bettors rely on data concerning PP bias from the previous year. This is the
information that appears in annual racing publications designed to aid horse selection. To examine
the extent to which individuals incorporate a comprehensive model of PP bias effects from year t2
1 when making their betting decisions in year t, the maximum LL values of two alternative CL
models are compared. The first simply incorporates odds probabilities (i.e., the model represented
by Eqn. 9, estimated using current year [t] data). The second is represented as follows:
pij~
exp (t ln (psij)zu ln (p
t{1
ij ))
Xnj
i
exp (t ln (psijzu ln (p
t{1
ij )))
  : ð11Þ
The pt{1ij values are estimated from a CL model incorporating PP bias effects from year t 2 1 as
follows:
pt{1ij ~
exp f2 a, b, x, yð Þt{1ij
 
Xnj
i~1
exp f2 a, b, x, yð Þt{1ij
  , ð12Þ
where the parameters a, b, x, and y are fixed and take the values obtained by estimating the CL
model indicated in Equation 7, estimated using year t 2 1 data. If it can be shown that a model
which simply incorporates odds probabilities contains as much information as a model that
incorporates odds probabilities and probabilities based on PP bias observed in the previous year,
this will then suggest that bettors’ subjective judgments, revealed in the odds, fully account for the
historical model of PP bias.
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Rather than rely on a historical model of PP bias, bettors may use a simplified (linear)
model of current data to capture PP bias effects. In order to explore this possibility, we first
established (from the R2 statistic) the degree to which the following model (which simply
incorporates linear PP bias effects) explains horses’ winning probabilities:
pij~
exp (dmij)
Xnj
i~1
exp (dmij)
: ð13Þ
To test whether the linear model of PP bias (13) explains variation in winning probabilities
of horses as well as the more comprehensive model of PP bias (7), the LL of the two models are
compared using an encompassing test (Mizon and Richard 1986) for non-nested models. In this
application, we fit the obvious combined model, which includes both the linear (13) and the
comprehensive model (7). If the parameters peculiar to (13) are insignificant, one accepts the
hypothesis that (7) ‘‘encompasses’’ (13), and vice versa. There are four possible outcomes, only
two of which are clear cut, being (7) encompasses (13) and vice versa.
In addition, to test whether bettors fully incorporate such a linear model of PP bias when
making their betting decisions, a comparison is made using a LR test of the amount of
information contained in two CL models. The first incorporates the log of the probabilities
implied by final odds and a linear function of PP of the following form:
pij~
exp dmijzl ln p
s
ij
  
Xnj
i~1
exp dmijzl ln p
s
ij
   ð14Þ
The second, represented by Equation 9, simply incorporates the log of the probabilities implied
by odds. If there is a significant difference between the maximum likelihoods of these two
models, then this will imply that linear PP bias effects are not fully incorporated into
individuals’ betting decisions.
4. Results
For all the models estimated across the whole period (1995–2000), it is found that g(mij,
Dj) and h(mij, Dj) are reasonably well-approximated by allowing the mean index function of mij
to equal 0.5. As races run at Wolverhampton are an average length of 1760 yards, this implies
that x and y 5 3520. Consequently, throughout the rest of this section it is only when
examining changes in the PP bias from year to year that the more complex forms of g(mij, Dj)
and h(mij, Dj) are invoked and parameters x and y are then estimated by maximizing the LL
with respect to x and y using a grid search.
Post-Position Bias Model
The first set of results are obtained by estimating two CL models using data for the period
1995–2000; the first (9) simply incorporates odds probabilities, and the second (10) incorporates
odds probabilities together with PP bias factors. The results are given in Table 1 and indicate that
the LRs of both models are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that they both incorporate a
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significant amount of information useful in predicting winning probabilities. The standard errors
indicate that the PP bias factors in (10) are not significant at the 5% level, but this may be because
the factors are correlated and/or because the LL is not approximated by a quadratic function
closely enough for asymptotic theory to be entirely reliable in this case. However, there is sufficient
evidence from a LR test comparing models (9) and (10) to suggest that the model incorporating the
three PP factors and the subjective probabilities of bettors (revealed as odds) contains significantly
more valuable information for predicting winners than the model that simply incorporates the
subjective probabilities of bettors (LR5 19.16, x22 [0.01]5 9.21). This suggests that bettors do not
fully account for PP bias in their probability judgments.
The results of estimating the PP bias model (7) are also presented in Table 1. These
indicate that the model’s LR is highly significant (LR 5 1098.26, x22 [0.01] 5 9.21) and the
pseudo-R2 statistic suggests that the model accounts for an estimated 12.80 ‘‘empirical percent
explained uncertainty’’ (Hauser 1978) of the variation in winning probabilities. This confirms
that PP bias has an important influence on race outcome. In order to determine the degree to
which PP bias is accounted for in bettors’ decisions, the R2 of model (9) is subtracted from the
R2 of model (10). The result, 0.21%, represents the explanatory power of PP bias not accounted
for in the bettors’ decisions. It was indicated above that PP alone accounts for 12.80% of the
variation in winning probabilities and, consequently (12.80 2 0.21)/12.80 5 98.36% of the
explanatory power of PP is accounted for in bettors’ subjective probability judgments.
Changing Nature of Post-Position Bias through Time
The results of estimating the PP bias model (7) for each of the years between 1995 and
2000 are presented in Table 2. The model LR statistics demonstrate that in each year PP bias
Table 1. Comparison of Models Incorporating (a) Odds Probabilities, (b) Odds Probabilities
and Post-Position Bias Factors, and (c) Post-Position Bias Factors for 1995–2000
Variable
Odds Probabilities
Model (9)
Post-Position Bias Factors +
Odds Probabilities Model (10)
Post-Position Bias
Factors Model (7)
Parameter
Estimate t-Value
Parameter
Estimate t-Value
Parameter
Estimate t-Value
Distance factora – 1.0 (fixed) – 1.0 (fixed)
Straights factora – 21.2036 21.19 21.6864 21.76
Bends factora – 0.5237 0.56 0.9599 1.07
ln(psij) 1.1843 31.40** 1.1841 31.34**
Model statistics
Restricted LL 24286.03 24286.03 24286.03
Unrestricted LL 23147.91 23138.33 23736.90
Model LRb 2276.24** 5424.60** 1098.26**
Critical value
(x2n [0.01])
6.64 (n 5 1) 11.35 (n 5 3) 9.21 (n 5 2)
Pseudo-R2 0.2655 0.2676 0.1280
N 1671 1671 1671
a These factors are divided by 10,000 to enable the model to converge.
b The LR statistic 5 22(LLo 2 LLm), where LLo and LLm are the maximums of the likelihood function where the
parameters are constrained to equal zero (restricted LL) and where there are no restrictions on the parameters
(unrestricted LL), respectively. This statistic is distributed x2n, where n is the number of parameters estimated in the
unrestricted model.
** p , 0.01.
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explains a significant amount of the variation in winning probabilities. However, the R2
statistics show that the degree to which the model explains variation of winning probabilities
changes substantially from year to year, even though the number of races remains fairly
constant; the percentage changes in the fraction explained (i.e., R2) being 226.44% (1996/5), +
26.34% (1997/6), + 4.46% (1998/7), 212.61% (1999/8), + 3.37% (2000/1999). The parameter
estimation procedure for model (7) is by grid search. Consequently, the standard errors and t-
values are conditional on the grid values of the power to which m is raised in the factors
designed to capture information concerning the distance traveled on the straights (‘‘straights
factor’’) and the distance traveled on the bends (‘‘bends factor’’). In addition, unconditional
standard errors for all parameters are determined by evaluating the analytic Hessian at the
relevant points. It is found that the size and significance, using conditional and unconditional
standard errors, of all the parameters vary substantially from year to year. In particular, the
sign of the bends factor changed four times from 1995–2000. These differences in the size,
significance, and sign of the parameters suggest that the influence of the different elements of
PP bias captured by model (7) have a changing influence over time. This is confirmed by a LR
test that demonstrates that the maximum LL obtained when estimating model (7) for all six
Table 2. Estimated Parameter Values of Annual PP Bias Models (7)a
Year LR x2(4)b
Pseudo
R2
N
(races)
Parameter Estimatesc
Straights Factord Bends Factord Index Valuee x Index Valuee y
(t-Value)f (t-Value)f – –
[t-Value]f [t-Value]f [t-Value]g [t-Value]g
1995 225.34++ 0.1471 299 21.9916** 0.26D29 3520** 50**
(24.72) (1.25) – –
[222.72] [0.23] [44.70] [5.38]
1996 152.04++ 0.1082 272 20.7865 20.14D29 16,520 320
(20.52) (21.09) – –
[20.44] [20.04] [0.23] [0.02]
1997 193.88++ 0.1367 275 21.4186 0.2103 2520 1520
(22.69) (2.57) – –
[20.95] [0.44] [1.84] [1.77]
1998 214.10++ 0.1428 290 22.2480 3.0110 2490** 31,070
(22.03) (1.68) – –
[20.81] [0.67] [2.37] [1.50]
1999 192.58++ 0.1248 298 21.6314** 20.25D210 14,510** 330**
(21.16) (23.03) – –
[213.33] [20.29] [5.94] [7.93]
2000 158.08++ 0.1290 237 20.0090 0.0009 3520 50*
(21.39) (1.34) – –
[20.21] [0.17] [1.45] [1.90]
a The standard errors of all the parameters are estimated using minus the Hessian matrix evaluated at the maximum of
the likelihood.
b The critical value of x24(0.01) 5 13.28.
c The distance factor (D) remains fixed (51) in all annual models.
d These factors are divided by 10,000 to enable the model to converge.
e To obtain these estimates, the LL was maximized with respect to x and y using a grid search.
f t-values (conditional) and [unconditional] on the estimated x and y values.
g Measures the number of standard errors 1/x or 1/y is from zero; this will not have (even asymptotically) a standard t
distribution as the model is not identified at zero.
** Unconditional t-values: ** p , 0.01, * p , 0.05.
++ p , 0.01.
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years combined is less (i.e., more negative) than the sum of the maximum LLs obtained from
estimating the model for each year separately (LR 5 36.62, x220[0.05] 5 31.41). This result
clearly demonstrates that if the coefficients of the parameters in the PP bias model are allowed
to change from year to year, then the separate annual models better explain winning
probabilities than a combined model for 1995–2000.
Taken together, these results confirm that PP bias changes substantially over the period
1995–2000 and that these changes are not uniform.
Accounting for Changes in Post-Position Bias
The extent to which the changes in PP bias are accounted for in individuals’ probability
judgments is explored by estimating models for each of the years 1995–2000, incorporating (i)
odds and PP bias factors (10) and (ii) odds probabilities (9) and the results are displayed in
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. LR tests that compare the maximum LL values of models (10) and
(9) for each year from 1995–2000 yield the following values: 27.50, 2.72, 6.9, 11.72, 12.28, and
0.36. These results indicate a significant difference in the amount of information concerning
winning probabilities captured by models (10) and (9) at the 1% level in 1995 and, additionally,
at the 5% level (x24 [0.05] 5 9.49) in 1998 and 1999. This suggests that bettors fully incorporated
information concerning PP bias in their betting decisions in 1996, 1997, and 2000, and also, to a
large extent, account for PP bias in 1998 and 1999. As was noted above, the parameter values in
the comprehensive models incorporating PP bias (7) change from year to year. Consequently, it
appears that bettors, in the majority of years, are able to adjust the model of PP bias that they
employ to account for current circumstances.
The proportion of variation in winning probabilities explained by PP bias that is not
captured in odds probabilities each year is determined by subtracting the R2 of the odds-only
model (9) from the R2 of the odds and PP bias model (10) and dividing the result by the R2 of
the PP bias model (7). This procedure yields the following values for each year from 1995–
2000, respectively: 0.1217, 0.0120, 0.0307, 0.0357, 0.0560, and 0.0047. These results indicate
that other than in 1995 and 1999 (when 12.17% and 5.60% of variation in winning
probabilities explained by PP bias were not accounted for in odds) more than 96% of the
variation in winning probabilities explained by PP bias was accounted for in individuals’
betting decisions.
In Table 4, features of the PP bias model (7), including whether the straights or bends
factors are significant, the R2 value of the model, and the annual change in the R2 are compared
with the degree to which PP bias is accounted for in bettors’ decisions. These results indicate
little obvious correlation between R2 values associated with the PP bias model in year t or t 2 1
and the degree to which bettors account for PP bias. For example, in 1995 (when odds do not
fully account for PP bias), the R2 value of the PP bias model is at its highest level; in 1999
(again, when odds do not fully account for PP bias), the PP bias model has the second-lowest
R2 value. Similarly, there appear to be no obvious associations between changes in the R2 value
of the PP bias model and the degree to which PP bias is accounted for in odds. However, in
those years when neither the straights factor nor the bends factor is significant in the PP bias
model, bettors largely account for PP bias in their decisions. Consequently, it is in the years
when only one of these factors is significant that bettors do not fully account for PP bias in their
decisions.
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Historical Model of Post-Position Bias
The results of estimating CL models based on an historical model of PP bias (12) for each
year 1996–2000 are given in Table 5. The standard errors imply the historical bias factors in
each of the annual models are not significant at 5% using a Wald test, but this may be because,
once again, the LL is not approximated by a quadratic function closely enough for asymptotic
theory to be entirely reliable in this case. However, there is sufficient evidence from the model
LR tests to conclude that these historical PP bias models account for a significant amount of
variation in winning probability and the R2 values range between 0.1078 and 0.1372.
Models for each year incorporating (i) historical model probabilities and odds
probabilities (11) and (ii) odds probabilities (9) are estimated and the results are also displayed
in Table 5. LR tests comparing these models (i.e., Eqns. 9 and 11) suggest that information
Table 3. Estimated Parameter Values of Annual Models Incorporating PP Bias Factors and
Odds Probabilities (10)a
Year
Model LR
x2(5)b Pseudo-R2
ln(Odds Probs)
Parameter Estimatesc
Index
Valuee x
Index
Valuee y
Straights
Factord Bends Factord
(t-Value)f (t-Value)f (t-Value)f – –
[t-Value]f [t-Value]f [t-Value]f [t-Value]g [t-Value]g
1995 447.82++ 0.2917 1.2477** 21.9044** 0.15D28 3320** 50
(13.47) (24.81) (1.35) – –
[12.13]h [21.25]h [0.02]h [2.55]h [0.48]h
1996 337.72++ 0.2411 1.1611** 21.2508 20.22D29 19,520 320
(12.49) (20.52) (20.45) – –
[12.49] [20.64] [20.58] [0.27] [0.02]
1997 330.80++ 0.2335 1.0148** 21.7943 0.1255 3520 1520
(11.01) (22.26) (2.18) – –
[11.01] [21.18] [0.35] [1.53] [0.94]
1998 418.36++ 0.2810 1.1791** 23.0449 5.3475 2760** 4040
(12.88) (22.62) (2.23) – –
[12.88] [21.01] [1.06] [2.93] [1.74]
1999 453.22++ 0.2957 1.2632** 21.0777 20.14D210 10,520 320
(14.20) (20.84) (23.21) – –
[14.20] [20.43] [20.06] [0.38] [0.05]
2000 354.80++ 0.2915 1.2671** 20.3381 0.16D29 10,420 340
(12.48) (20.25) (0.54) – –
[12.42]h [20.15]h [0.01]h [0.09]h [0.18]h
a The standard errors of all the parameters are estimated using minus the Hessian matrix evaluated at the maximum of
the likelihood.
b The critical value of x25 (0.01) 5 15.09.
c The distance factor (D) remains fixed (51) in all annual models.
d These factors are divided by 10,000 to enable the model to converge.
e To obtain these estimates, the LL was maximized with respect to x and y using a grid search.
f t-values (conditional) and [unconditional] on the estimated x and y values.
g Measures the number of standard errors 1/x or 1/y is from zero; this will not have (even asymptotically) a standard t
distribution as the model is not identified at zero.
h Standard errors estimated using OPG (outer product of gradient) method, where the analytic Hessian was not positive
definite.
* Unconditional t-values: p , 0.05.
** Unconditional t-values: p , 0.01.
++ p , 0.01.
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from the historical models is fully accounted for in bettors’ probability judgments in each of the
five years (LR 5 0.5, 0.72, 2.90, 3.38, and 0.12 for 1996–2000, respectively; x24[0.05] 5 9.49).
This result is confirmed by comparing the R2 values of the two models in each year. The
percentage of variation in winning probabilities explained by the historical model that is
accounted for in odds varies between 98.39% and 100%.
A comparison of the results of estimating models incorporating (i) current-year PP bias
factors (7), given in Table 2, and (ii) historical PP bias factors (12), displayed in Table 5,
suggests that model (7) contains more information than model (12) (LR 5 1.08, 8.70, 8.72, 7.1,
and 2.32 for 1996–2000, respectively) in most years, even though a formal LR test cannot be
performed as the models are not nested. The R2 value for model (7) is greater than the R2 value
for the corresponding year of the historical model (12) for each of the years 1995–2000.
Consequently, a sign test suggests that a model incorporating current PP bias factors (7)
explains a significantly (at the 5% level) greater proportion of winning probability than a model
based on historical PP bias factors (12).
Linear Model of Post-Position Bias
The results of estimating a linear model of PP bias (13) for the whole period 1995–2000
and for each of the individual years are given in Table 6. The LR statistics of these models
suggest that the simplified model of PP bias accounts for a significant proportion of the
variation in winning probabilities of horses throughout the period; the R2 values of these
models ranging from 0.1086 to 0.1438. However, an encompassing test confirms that the more
comprehensive model of PP bias (7) for the whole period accounts for a significantly greater
proportion of variation in winning probabilities of horses than the linear model (13) LR of
nested model (involving parameters in the comprehensive and linear models) versus
comprehensive model 5 3.42 (x21[0.05] 5 3.84), implying that the comprehensive model
encompasses the linear model; LR of nested model (involving parameters in the comprehensive
and linear models) versus linear model 5 6.65 (x21[0.05] 5 3.84), implying that the linear model
does not encompass the comprehensive model.
Table 4. Estimated Parameter Values and Goodness of Fit Statistics of Annual Models
Incorporating Odds Probabilities (9)
Year
Parameter Estimate:
Ln(Odds Probs)
(t-Value)
Model LR
x2(1)a
Statistics:
Pseudo-R2
Proportion of
PP Bias Not
Accounted for
in Odds
Pseudo-R2
of PP
Model (7)
Change in
R2 from
Previous Year S B
1995 1.2335** (13.46) 420.32** 0.2738 0.1217+ 0.1471 Y N
1996 1.1556** (12.45) 335.00** 0.2398 0.0120 0.1082 226.44 N N
1997 1.0233** (11.11) 323.90** 0.2293 0.0307 0.1367 +26.34 N N
1998 1.1707** (12.88) 406.64** 0.2730 0.0357++ 0.1428 +4.46 N N
1999 1.2518** (14.19) 440.96** 0.2882 0.0560+ 0.1248 212.61 Y N
2000 1.2668** (12.49) 354.08** 0.2909 0.0047 0.1290 +3.37 N N
S: Straights factor significant at 5%; B: Bends factor significant at 5%.
a The critical value of x21(0.01) 5 6.64.
++,+ Indicate for LR test results comparing the maximum LL values of models incorporating (a) odds and PP bias factors
(10) with (b) odds probabilities (9): p , 0.05 (+), and p , 0.01 (++).
** p , 0.01.
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An assessment of the degree to which individuals account for this linear model of PP is
obtained by comparing the results of estimating CL models incorporating (i) probabilities
implied by final odds and a linear function of PP (14), the results of which are also given in
Table 6, and (ii) probabilities implied by odds alone (9), the results of which are given in
Table 1 for 1995–2000 combined and in Table 4 for each of the individual years. Comparing
the maximum LLs of models (14) and (9) yields the following results for the whole period and
for each year from 1995–2000, respectively: LR 5 14.54, 23.00, 1.66, 0.32, 1.74, 1.56, and
0.80; x21(0.05) 5 3.84. It appears that while for all six years combined the simple linear effect
of PP bias is not fully accounted for in bettors’ decisions, this largely arises because the linear
effect is not accounted for in 1995. From 1996 onwards the linear PP effect is fully
discounted in odds.
In a similar manner to that discussed above, the proportion of variation in winning
probabilities explained by the linear PP bias effect not captured in odds probabilities each year
is determined by subtracting the R2 of the odds only model (9) from the R2 of the odds and
linear PP bias model (14) and dividing the result by the R2 of the linear PP bias model (13). This
procedure yields the following values for each year from 1995–2000, respectively: 0.1024,
0.0081, 0.0008, 0.0065, 0.0058, and 0.0030. In 1995, over 10% of the variation in winning
probabilities explained by a linear PP bias model was not captured within odds, but in
subsequent years, bettors’ decisions account for over 99% of this variation, with a trend to
capture more of the information in later years.
5. Discussion
Three key findings emerge from the results: First, bettors are skilled in effectively
accounting for changing PP bias information in their betting decisions, even though the
changes in track management practices that influence the bias are not announced. Second,
bettors appear to learn through experience to account for this dynamic information. Third,
bettors adopt effective simplification strategies to cope with the complexity of dynamic
information. Each of these findings is now explored in turn.
Effective Use of Sporadically Changing Information
Throughout the period 1995–2000, PP bias accounted for an average of 12.80% of the
variation in winning probabilities and 98.36% of this variation was accounted for in bettors’
decisions. In three out of the six years examined, bettors’ probability judgments fully accounted
for a comprehensive model of PP bias using current year’s data, and they largely accounted for
it in two further years. They achieved this despite substantial changes from year to year in the
degree to which the comprehensive model of PP bias explained winning probabilities, and the
sign, size, and significance of factors designed to capture information concerning differential PP
advantages attributable to the distance traveled on straights and bends, respectively. In
addition, bettors were able to adjust their own PP bias models despite the fact that many of the
racetrack management procedures responsible for the changing PP bias were not announced to
the public. These results are in line with studies conducted by Canfield, Fauman, and Ziemba
(1987) and Betton (1994).
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Bettors’ ability to utilize the changing information set in their probability judgments may
result from a number of factors shown to be associated with good calibration. First, bettors
have a strong motivation to make accurate probability judgments as their own financial
resources and often their peer group esteem depend on the outcome of their decisions (Saunders
and Turner 1987). Previous research confirms the premise that judgments improve when
incentives are provided (Beach et al. 1987; Ashton 1992; Waller et al. 1999).
Second, experience and domain-specific knowledge have been shown to be associated with
accurate probability judgments (e.g., Joyce and Biddle 1981; Smith and Kida 1991). Most
individuals who bet with bookmakers are familiar with the betting task (Johnson and Bruce
2001) and undertake considerable research to assess the factors that may influence race
outcome (Neal 1998). In addition, experienced horserace bettors often act in a cognitively
sophisticated manner, incorporating data in a complex cognitive model (Ceci and Liker 1986).
They also have the advantage that those who frequently make probability judgments are often
better calibrated (Ferrell 1994).
Third, it has been suggested that the accuracy of probability judgments is often better in
natural rather than laboratory settings (Beach et al. 1987; Bazerman 1994; Ferrell 1994), and
earlier research has demonstrated that betting behavior differs significantly between laboratory
and real world environments (Anderson and Brown 1984).
Two further factors may help to explain bettors’ apparent ability to account for the
dynamic and often implicit PP information: ‘‘recency’’ and the predictive nature of the task.
Recency can cause biases in some contexts, but it may help individuals to adjust more rapidly to
structural shifts which can occur in dynamic information sets (e.g., Ashton and Kennedy 2002).
In addition, bettors’ probability judgments are predictions, and calibration associated with
prediction has been shown to be more accurate than that related to an individual’s perception
of their memory accuracy (Wright and Ayton 1988).
In summary, there are a number of factors associated with the judgment task, the task
environment, and the nature of experienced bettors that are favorable to accurate probability
judgments. The results reported here suggest that under these favorable conditions bettors are
skilled in accounting for a dynamic information set even when alterations in the underlying
mechanisms that cause these changes are not made public.
Learning to Cope with Sporadically Changing Information
The results of the current study may provide evidence that bettors learn, through outcome
feedback, to cope with changing information. Outcome feedback often has a positive effect on
the accuracy of probability judgments because it allows decision makers to learn which cues are
important (McClelland and Bolger 1994; Koehler 1996). This particularly occurs in real world
environments where individuals learn through observation to identify what data is redundant
and unreliable and what cognitive models are most applicable (McClelland and Bolger 1994).
Practice with homogeneous tasks also improves probability judgments, particularly where
forecasting is performed on a repetitive and sequential basis (Lock 1987) because this allows
individuals to learn judgment relevant cues (McClelland and Bolger 1994). Similarly, violations
of rational choice are often reduced where judgments and feedback occur regularly (Keren
1991). There is a high degree of uniformity between betting markets and bettors can engage
repeatedly in a similar task, allowing them to become familiar with the processes and outcomes
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of the market. This enables them to develop an effective basis for interpreting dynamic market
information. Goodwin and Wright (1992, p. 215) observe that ‘‘performance-demonstrated
expertise in probability judgments is underpinned by practice and regular performance
feedback’’ and horserace betting markets provide bettors with just these conditions. Outcome
feedback per se is not sufficient for good probability judgments, as is evidenced by poor
calibration observed amongst physicians who receive delayed and non-uniform feedback
(Bennett 1980). However, bettors receive uniform and immediate outcome feedback that is
unambiguous.
We find that bettors’ judgments fully account for a comprehensive model of PP bias based
on the previous year’s results and that bettors account for a large proportion of the current year
PP bias in their probability judgments. However, there are three years—1995, 1998, and 1999—
when a significant amount of current-year PP bias is not accounted for in their judgments.
Bettors’ inability to fully account for the bias in 1995 may have resulted from a lack of outcome
feedback, as the racetrack had only been operating for one year. In addition, research suggests
that individuals tend to discount evidence that runs counter to existing perceptions (Harries et
al. 2004). Consequently, it is likely that in the first year of racetrack operation (1994) bettors,
based on the configuration of the track, would have expected horses with PP close to the inside
to have a natural advantage. This expectation may have been reinforced by horseracing
publications, as a common view of racing journalists is that small tracks with tight bends, like
Wolverhampton, will exhibit such a bias. Beyer (1983), for example, observes that horses with
an inside PP on such tracks invariably have an advantage. However, one leading racing
publication, Raceform (1995, p. xxxiii), reporting on the Wolverhampton results in 1994 states:
‘‘high numbers have a marked advantage on the new fiber-sand course.’’ Consequently, the first
year’s results did not conform to the cognitive model derived from horserace publications and
their own observation of the track configuration. Under these circumstances, it is likely that
some of the outcome feedback would have been ignored when forming judgments in the
following year (1995). Further outcome feedback in 1995 may have helped to develop a new
cognitive model that accounted for the outside PP having an advantage. A comprehensive
model of PP bias was then fully accounted for in bettors’ probability judgments in 1996 and
1997. Despite this, bettors did not fully account for current year’s PP bias in 1998 and 1999
when they already had four years of outcome feedback. However, in 1998 and 1999 they did
fully account for the PP bias observed from the previous year (see section 4.4). In addition, the
degree to which they accounted for variation in winning probabilities explained by current year
PP bias in 1999 was significantly greater than in 1995 (93.99% cf. 87.83%). These results suggest
that outcome feedback may have been employed to improve performance in these later years.
In fact, in 2000, bettors’ probability judgments again fully accounted for information regarding
current year PP bias derived from a comprehensive current-year model of the phenomenon.
Simplification Strategies to Handle Sporadically Changing Information
The results suggest that the simplified linear model of PP bias does not capture all the
information contained in a comprehensive model of PP over the whole period 1995–2000.
However, the linear approximation of the PP bias appears to be a reasonable model for bettors
to employ because it captures 12.76% of the variation in winning probabilities over the period
1995–2000 compared with 12.80% for the comprehensive model. In addition, we find that
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bettors account for 90% of the variation in winning probabilities explained by a linear PP bias
model in their probability judgments in 1995, then 99.2%, 99.9%, 99.35%, 99.4%, and 99.7%,
respectively, in subsequent years. The general trend to incorporate more of the changing
information captured by this linear model over time suggests that bettors may employ a linear
model of PP as an input to their cognitive model of this phenomenon. It should also be noted
that the values of the model parameters change each year. Consequently, it appears that bettors
are able to adapt the linear model they employ to meet current circumstances. This also lends
some support to the notion that bettors learn to improve the model they employ through
outcome feedback.
Subsequent to 1995, bettors’ probability judgments fully incorporate (at a 1% level of
significance) a comprehensive model of current year’s PP bias. In addition, a model
incorporating current year’s PP bias ([7], see Table 2) explains more of the variation in
winning probabilities in each of the years 1996–2000 than an historical model of PP ([12], see
Table 5). These results suggest that bettors do not simply mimic the previous year’s PP bias in
their betting decisions; rather, they appear to learn to adapt the model to the bias experienced
in the current year.
It has been observed that individuals operating in familiar task domains can become
attuned to these environments. Under these circumstances individuals are capable of adopting
simple, efficient heuristics that capture the features that are essential to good decision making
(Gigerenzer 2004). In particular, it is argued that evolution equips individuals to handle
information in the form of frequencies in the natural environments in which they make
decisions (Gigerenzer 1996, 2000). This research evidence is largely based on supplied
frequencies rather than those acquired through outcome feedback. Edgell et al. (2004, p. 213)
found that ‘‘experience with the environment is not always sufficient for good performance.’’
Consequently, it may well be that bettors acquire their understanding of PP bias from ‘‘natural
sampling’’: observation of the winning frequencies of certain PP, together with more codified
win frequency information and narrative accounts of the bias from racing publications. In fact,
because several racing publications provide a similar account of the PP bias at Wolverhampton,
it is likely that this information is afforded greater scrutiny than if it came from a single source
(Harkins and Petty 1987). Finally, it is possible that explanations for PP bias given in racing
publications provide more understanding of the reasons for the bias, and it has been shown that
cognitive information feedback of this sort can assist learning more than simple outcome
feedback (Remus et al. 1996).
6. Conclusion
The principal aims of this article were to identify to what extent and in what manner
bettors’ probability judgments account for dynamic, implicit information. The results offer an
interesting insight into individuals’ information-processing abilities. They suggest that at least
some groups of decision makers, operating in certain domains, are skilled in accounting for
dynamic information in their probability judgments. In particular, the results indicate that
U.K. horserace bettors are able to adopt efficient heuristics to cope with dynamic information,
which is subject to structural shifts and where the underlying causal mechanisms (e.g., changing
racetrack management practices) are not formally made known to them. Under these
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conditions bettors appear to learn to adapt the models they employ to capture the evolving
information. It is suggested that a number of factors contributed towards creating a favorable
setting for the effective utilization of a dynamic information set. These include: strong
incentives, the decision makers’ experience in the task domain, the nature of the task (e.g.,
prediction), and the nature of the task environment (i.e., a naturalistic setting). In addition, it is
argued that the unequivocal and uniform nature of outcome feedback together with cognitive
information feedback may have assisted the bettors in learning to adapt their cognitive models
as the information set evolved. This research examined bettors’ skill in adapting to dynamic PP
information over a five-year period. It is possible that outcome feedback over a longer period
may enable bettors to develop even more sophisticated coping mechanisms. The continuing
dynamic nature of PP bias at Wolverhampton since 2000 will provide an ideal setting for such
research.
The results reported here should provide some comfort for regulators that bettors are
able to adapt their decision-making behavior to cope with even hostile information
environments. Specifically, in relation to bettors’ ability to detect and react to PP biases,
there appears no immediate need for additional regulation to force racetrack operators to
disclose more information concerning their track management practices. More generally, the
results may question the need for further restrictive regulation in horseracing concerning
information disclosure, which various commentators have called for, relating to such factors
as the body weight of horses, sectional timing in races, and scientific measurement of the
‘‘going.’’
The ability to make appropriate probability judgments in the face of dynamic information
is vital in many areas of human activity. The results reported here suggest that individuals
under certain conditions may have this ability, but it is not clear whether these results are
transferable to other decision domains or to other groups of decision makers. Further research
in other domains is clearly needed. However, the quest to isolate those factors that can improve
probability judgments in dynamic environments is clearly an important one. While the current
study does not permit the isolation and manipulation of the factors that it is suggested may
have enhanced performance in this study, there is scope for subsequent laboratory studies to
shed further light on their respective influences. Such work could have important implications
for regulators who are seeking to develop a careful balance between restrictive regulation that
forces the disclosure of detailed information and a light touch that allows free markets to
flourish.
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